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Convenience Theory of Cryptocurrency Crime: A Content Analysis of U.S.
Federal court Decisions

This article examines cryptocurrency cases decided in the U.S. District and Circuit Courts
to determine the applicability of Gottschalk’s convenience theory of white collar crime to
cryptocurrency crime litigation and to empirically analyze whether the conditions under
which cryptocurrency offenses occurred show support for the convenience theory.
Analysis of U.S. federal district and circuit court case law involving cryptocurrency crimes
and fraud indicate support for the convenience theory of white-collar crime. Defendants in
various schemes were motivated by financial gain, either for the company or for personal
use. Their roles and positions in the businesses allowed them access to resources that
helped them perpetrate fraud through the following mechanisms: (1) operation of front
companies; (2) relationship building by defendants; (3) over representing profits that
investors would obtain from purchases of virtual currencies, representing that tokens were
safe and reliable investments when they were risky, and overestimating abilities and
capacities to provide services promised to investors in securities fraud; (4) breaching
fiduciary duties to their clients and corporate stockholders by misappropriating profits for
their own personal gain; and, (5) engaging in dark web transactions that guaranteed
anonymity. Defendants also employed various neutralization techniques to justify their
crimes.

Keywords: cryptocurrency; virtual currency; convenience theory; white collar crime;
financial fraud; corporate crime

Introduction
Virtual currencies or cryptocurrencies are: (1) digital assets used as a medium of
exchange (Young, Donley, and Kneller 2016); (2) stored electronically in “digital wallets” and
transacted on the internet through a direct peer-to-peer system; and (3) called “cryptocurrencies”
because they use “cryptographic protocols to secure transactions” recorded on publicly available
decentralized ledgers called “blockchains” (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a:218). The blockchain
2

allows the public to verify and acknowledge transfers of virtual currency from one user to
another “without requiring any central intermediary” (Commodity Futures Trading Commission
2017). Advocates of distributed ledgers, the blockchain technology underlying virtual currencies,
claim that these will “enhance economic efficiency, mitigate centralized systemic risk, defend
against fraudulent activity and improve data quality and governance” (Giancarlo 2016, 2018).
Virtual currencies, however, are not backed by any government, fiat currency, or commodity
(Anello and Lee 2017) and at least one federal district court has ruled that bitcoin is not “money”
although it operates as a medium of exchange because, unlike cash or currency, it “does not issue
from or enjoy the protection of any sovereign” (U.S v. Petix 2016:*5).
The price of bitcoin and other virtual currencies remains volatile, rising and falling at
extreme rates (Kharif 2017). On Feb. 6, 2018, coinmarketcap.com reported that there were more
than 1,500 virtual currencies with bitcoin having the largest market capitalization of
$121,264,863,386— one unit of bitcoin was valued at $7,196.92, while Strong Hands, the
cheapest virtual currency was valued at $0.000001 (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a). The “combined
market capitalization” of all virtual currencies dropped from $795 billion on January 6, 2018 to
$329 billion on Feb. 6, 2018 (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a:219; Kharpal 2018). Due to their
extreme variability in value, online exchanges such as Coinbase were created to allow the public
to trade and invest in virtual currencies (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a; Popper 2017).
The increase in online virtual currency transactions has resulted in a concomitant increase
in fraudulent and criminal activity (Sanchez 2017). Silk Road, an online market for illicit activity
and drugs, allowed transactions only in bitcoin. Since its closure following undercover
operations by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, other online black markets have
sprouted, transacting solely in virtual currencies (Burks 2017). Virtual currency exchanges are
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also susceptible to hacking and theft (Hern 2014). Hackers, for instance, have stolen
approximately $532.6 million from the Tokyo-based cryptocurrency exchange Coincheck Inc.,
raising questions about security and regulatory protection (Wilson, Sano, and Zaharia 2018).
These criminal activities have led to calls for increased governmental oversight and regulation of
virtual currency (Braaten 2019).

Legal context of cryptocurrency regulation

Cryptocurrency as funds
Table 1 provides a summary of the statutes governing cryptocurrency litigation. Section
1960 makes it a crime to knowingly operate an “unlicensed money transmitting business” (U.S.
v. Budovsky 2015:*6) and provides a penalty of a fine and not more than five years imprisonment
(18 U.S.C. § 1960(a)). Section 5330, a provision of the Bank Secrecy Act, requires the
registration of money transmitting businesses with the Secretary of Treasury while 31 C.F.R. §
1022.380(a)(1) requires its registration with the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”). FinCEN also issued clarificatory guidelines, stating
that virtual currency exchangers are considered money transmitters (the “2013 FinCEN
Guidance”) and that existing Bank Secrecy Act regulations apply to persons creating or
transmitting virtual currencies (U.S. v. Budovsky 2015; U.S v. Lott 2014; U.S. Dep’t of Treasury
FinCEN 2013). The law and regulations require businesses to register as a money transmitter
within 180 days from the date of its organization or incorporation. Cryptocurrencies such as
bitcoin are subject to money transmitting and money laundering laws because they can be
purchased in exchange for currency, act as a denominator of value, and are used in financial
transactions (Boumediene v. Bush 2008; Clark v. Rameker 2014; Nix v. Hedden 1893; Oedel
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1997; SEC v. Shavers 2013; U.S v. Faiella 2014; Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enterprises, Inc. 1997;
Yates v. U.S 2015).

Cryptocurrencies as commodities
The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) defines “commodities” as including “all other
goods and articles” and “all services, rights, and interests” in which contracts “for future delivery
are presently or in the future dealt in” (Title 7 U.S.C. §1(a)(9)). A “commodity” is “an article of
trade or commerce” (Garner 2014), “an economic good” (Merriam Webster 2019), “goods sold
in the market with a quality and value uniform throughout the world” (Prentis 2015:626), a
“store of value” that accommodates man’s physical wants and needs (Litwack 2015:343), and a
“type of monetary exchange” (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a:225; Prentis 2015:628-629). In an
administrative proceeding in 2015, the CFTC issued an order in which it found that virtual
currencies can be classified as commodities (In the Matter of: Coinflip, Inc. 2015).
Table 1 summarizes the commodity anti-fraud provisions of Title 7 U.S.C. §9(1) of the
CEA and 17 C.F.R. § 180.1. To prove a violation of the commodity fraud provisions of the CEA,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) must show that: (1) defendants engaged
in prohibited conduct (e.g., employed a fraudulent scheme; made a material misrepresentation,
misleading statement or deceptive omission; or engaged in a business practice that operated as a
fraud); (2) with scienter or intent; and (3) in connection with a contract of sale of a commodity in
interstate commerce (CFTC v. Commodity Inv. Grp., Inc. 2006; CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co.,
Inc. 2002). The CFTC has jurisdiction “if there is fraud or manipulation involving a virtual
currency traded in interstate commerce” (CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities 2014:1348; CFTC
v. S. Tr. Metals, 2018:1319).
The CFTC is one of the federal administrative bodies exercising partial and concurrent
5

supervision over virtual currencies (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a; Giancarlo 2018). The CFTC has
anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority over “any contract of sale of any commodity in
interstate commerce” (CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. 2018:495). The Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), Department of Justice, Treasury
Department, and state agencies have also exercised their concurrent regulatory authority over
virtual currencies (Gorman 2018). The U.S. approach to oversight of virtual currency is
“multifaceted” and “multi-regulatory” (Giancarlo 2018:10), consisting of the following: (1)
criminal law prosecutions of Ponzi-like schemes by the Department of Justice, or state criminal
agencies, or civil litigation based on allegations of fraud (CFTC v. McDonnell 2018a; U.S v.
Faiella 2014; U.S v. Lord 2017); (2) regulation as commodities by the CFTC (Giancarlo 2018);
(3) regulation as securities by the SEC (SEC v. Plexcorps 2017); (4) regulation for violation of
U.S. anti-money laundering laws by the FinCEN (Hudak 2017); (5) regulation as property by the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) (IRS Notice 2014-21; U.S v. Coinbase, Inc. 2017); (6) selfregulation by private exchanges (Nikkei Asian Review 2017); and (7) state regulations (Loconte
2017).
_____________________________
Insert Table 1 here
_____________________________
Cryptocurrencies as securities
Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act grants a private right of action against any person
who offers or sells an unregistered security in violation of Section 5 (Scheck Invs., L.P. v.
Kensington Mgmt., Inc. 2009, SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc. 1999). Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 prohibit “fraudulent conduct
or practices in connection with the offer or sale of securities” by means of interstate commerce
6

(SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc. 2001:855). The term “security” under the Securities Act and the
Howey Test includes an “investment contract” which involves: “(1) an investment of money, (2)
in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others
(Gugick v. Melville Capital, LLC 2014:*4; S.E.C. v. Edwards, 2004:395, quoting United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman 1975:852; S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co. 1946:299-299; Tippens v. Round
Island Plantation LLC 2009:*9, quoting SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc. 1999:1199).
Transactions involving virtual currency are investment contracts or securities subject to federal
securities laws, including the registration requirements and anti-fraud provisions of the SEC
(Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC 2019; Hodges v. Harrison 2019; SEC v. Blockvest, LLC 2018).

Convenience theory of white collar crime
White-collar crime typically involves offenders with special access to resources and
opportunities due to their corporate roles, professional positions, power, influence, and trust by
others (Felson and Boba 2017; Nolasco, Vaughn, and del Carmen 2013). Nolasco et al.
(2013:387), for instance, explained that perpetrators of pyramid and Ponzi schemes were able to
defraud investors through “deliberate misinformation and false promises” and that “defrauded
investors also placed a significant amount of trust and reliance” on the offenders due to various
“trust and affinity relationships based on socio-economic status, race or ethnicity, religion or
special circumstances (i.e., disability or seniority).” Offenders in white collar crime abuse their
organizational positions or professional status to gain information and access to victims (Felson
and Boba 2017).
Marketing theory explains that convenience is the perceived savings in time and effort
expended to accomplish a task, solve a problem, or exploit favorable circumstances (Farquhar
and Rowley 2009). Convenience pertains to the time and effort exerted “before, during, and after
7

an activity” (Gottschalk 2017a:605) when accomplishing an illegal transaction process or
processes (Collier and Kimes 2012). Convenience orientation refers to the individuals’ and
organizations’ preference for convenient actions and strategies, including illegal actions, which
save them time and effort when accomplishing goals (Farquhar and Rowley 2009; Gottschalk
2018c; Mai and Olsen 2016). Convenience orientation for illegal actions “increases when
negative attitudes toward legal actions increase” (Gottschalk 2018a:1602). Motivated by greed or
facing strain, white collar offenders perceive an illegal action as a viable and convenient solution
to a difficult problem despite potential costs consisting of the likelihood of detection and future
punishment. Financial crime saves them time and effort when solving a problem to obtain
personal or organizational profit. Gottschalk (2017a:605) describes this as “[p]aying for
convenience”—“reducing time and effort now entails a greater potential for future cost.”
Convenience theory explains that convenience in three dimensions facilitate white-collar
crime: (1) the economic dimension or financial desire attracts offenders to crime as a convenient
way of satisfying desires for personal and organizational profits, including achieving the
American dream (Trahan, Marquart, and Mullings 2005); (2) the organizational dimension or
organizational opportunity enables offenders with key corporate roles to gain convenient access
to corporate resources and personnel; and, (3) the behavioral dimension enables offenders to
conveniently justify and rationalize their deviant behaviors (Gottschalk 2017, 2018a, 2018b,
2019; Kaptein and Van Helvoort 2019).
Gottschalk’s (2017a) convenience theory posits the following: (1) financial crime can
occur within an organization without being detected; (2) offenders are motivated by profits and
success resulting from negative (threats) and positive (strengths) circumstances; offenders are
motivated when faced with threats to protect company interests, to survive (Blickle et al. 2006),
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or to pay off personal debts (Brightman 2009). Offenders are motivated from strengths when
expanding into profitable foreign markets or satisfying their greed (Bucy et al. 2008; GoldstrawWhite 2012; Hamilton and Mickethwait 2006); (3) the offender’s profession and organizational
role grants him or her access to resources (Benson and Simpson 2015; Pickett and Pickett 2002)
and enables him or her to commit white-collar crime without substantial risk of detection and
punishment (Aguilera and Vadera 2008; Haines 2014), especially when the prevailing
organizational structure and culture is conducive to unethical or illegal behavior (Dion 2008;
Pontell, Black, and Geis 2014; Puranam, Alexy, and Reitzig 2014); (4) the organizational
environment enables the offender to commit financial crime “without being perceived as a
deviant person or suspicious person” because of his or her social capital (Gottschalk 2017a:613);
and (5) acceptance and neutralization of deviant behavior facilitates criminal behavior (Bystrova
and Gottschalk 2015) by eliminating feelings of guilt when committing criminal acts (Sutherland
1940; Sykes and Matza 1957).

Dimensions of convenience theory
Economic dimension of crime. White-collar crime is a profit-driven crime, which results
from “favorable circumstances” characterized by threats and strengths (Gottschalk, 2017a:606).
Threats arise due to various types of strain (Langton and Piquero 2007), including sunk costs
arising from capital expenses already invested in the enterprise, possibility of loss, bankruptcy,
and unique market structures peculiar to the industry, such as monopolies (Chang, Lu, and Chen
2005; Piquero 2012). Potential competitors in monopolized industries, for example, are pressured
to either join the monopoly or commit white-collar crime to protect their economic interests
(Blickle et al. 2006). Strengths arise due to favorable circumstances, including : (1) the
possibility of getting large contracts and foreign subsidiaries through bribing foreign government
9

officials; (2) the likelihood of being promoted, receiving increased compensation, and earning
bonuses due to goal achievement; and (3) the possibility of enhancing corporate goodwill or
individual reputation resulting from accumulation of profits (Gottschalk 2017b). Motivated by
financial gain and greed, offenders resort to white-collar crime to ensure economic survival.
The economic dimension assumes a rational choice in which offenders weigh their
economic interests against the probability of detection (Welsh et al. 2014) and desist from
committing crime where punishment is more certain or severe (Pratt and Cullen 2005). An
offender will commit white-collar crime if the illegal action is the most convenient and expedient
option (Agnew 2014) that would allow him or her to achieve gains with the least amount of time
and energy; offenders are more likely to commit white-collar crime because of his or her
perception of the low possibility of punishment and detection by the authorities (Gottschalk
2017b).
Organizational dimension. The organizational dimension of convenience theory explains
that white-collar criminals have the opportunity to commit illegal acts by virtue of their corporate
positions and professional roles in society. Corporate officers (e.g., CEOs, CFOs, chairpersons,
and executives) and business professionals (e.g., lawyers and accountants) abuse their positions
and influence to access resources and commit white-collar crime for corporate or personal gain
(Reed and Yeager 1996). Criminal opportunity is “the presence of a favorable combination of
circumstances that renders a possible course of action relevant” (Aguilera and Vadera 2008:434).
Opportunity arises when offenders perceive that they can engage in fraudulent or illegal behavior
without surveillance, accountability, detection, or punishment (Benson and Simpson 2015;
Fligstein and Roehrkasse 2016; Haines 2014). An organizational culture, for instance, where
misconduct and unethical practices are pervasive encourages corporate employees to participate
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in white-collar crime (Ashforth et al. 2008; Punch 2003). Opportunity also depends on the
offender’s social capital which enables his or her access to resources and fosters trust due to his
or her position in a social or organizational hierarchy or network (Adler and Kwon 2002; Hansen
2009; Heath 2008).
Behavioral dimension. The behavioral dimension examines the causes and justifications
of white-collar crime, including the situational context within which it occurs (Koppen, Poot, and
Blokland 2010). White-collar criminal behavior occurs, for example, because: (1) it is
convenient for the criminal to be deceitful to obtain personal gain at the expense of others
(Pickett and Pickett 2002); (2) offenders apply techniques of neutralization that enable them to
believe their actions are not unlawful, including denying responsibility, injury, and victim,
condemning the condemners, appealing to higher loyalties, normality of action, entitlement, legal
mistake, acceptability of their own mistakes, and existence of dilemmas where reasonable
tradeoffs were made before committing the crime (Benson and Simpson 2015; Gottschalk 2017b;
Siponen and Vance 2010; Sykes and Matza 1957); (3) narcissistic behavior (Arnulf and
Gottschalk 2013; Ouimet 2009, 2010), including narcissistic organizational identification,
enables the offender to perceive his or her identity as central to the identity of the organization
(Galvin, Lange, and Ashforth 2015); and (4) small indiscretions over time which lead to
incremental progression toward serious white-collar crime because of the presence of financial
gains and benefits and the concomitant absence of supervision or control in an organizational
culture permissive of unethical behavior (Welsh et al. 2014). This results in a slippery slope
“defined as a gradual decline in which no one event makes one aware that he or she is acting
unethically” (Arjoon 2008:78).
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Gottschalk (2018a) found support for convenience theory in his analysis of data involving
405 white-collar prisoners in Norway from 2009 to 2015: (1) offenders were motivated by desire
for corporate profits (17% of sample) or personal gain (83%) (economic dimension); (2) all
offenders occupied trusted positions in their organizations (organizational dimension); and (3)
offenders applied neutralization techniques to justify their crimes (behavioral dimension).
Content analysis of media reports, court documents, and autobiographies showed that whitecollar offenders employed the following neutralization techniques: (1) denied responsibility by
rejecting accountability for the crime and denied leadership roles; (2) denied injury from the
crime and refuted occurrence of harm; (3) dismissed the victims by denying that anyone suffered
harm; (4) condemned the condemners by expressing skepticism of critics; (5) appealed to higher
loyalties as a reason for their actions; (6) alleged normality of action by arguing that everyone
does it; (7) claimed entitlement to action because of the situation; (8) argued legal mistake and
considered infringement irrelevant because of error in the law; (9) felt entitled to make mistakes
and argued that illegal action was within acceptable mistaken quotas; and (10) presented
dilemma trade-offs by weighting various concerns that resulted in the illegality.

Objectives
Traditional methods of prosecution and enforcement against cryptocurrency crimes may
no longer be appropriate because of the complexity of transactions involving cryptocurrency and
the anonymity of the blockchain network through which these transactions occur. For
criminologists, the rise in cryptocurrency crime presents a problem that must be examined and
explained through appropriate theories. This article examines cryptocurrency cases decided in
the U.S. District Courts and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The article applies Gottschalk’s
convenience theory of white collar crime to cryptocurrency crime litigation to empirically
12

analyze whether the conditions under which cryptocurrency offenses occurred show support for
the convenience theory. Through a systematic analyses of the mechanisms by which
cryptocurrency crimes were perpetrated and examination of the common themes underlying each
form of virtual currency scheme, the article explores the underlying conditions that allowed
perpetration of various cryptocurrency offenses. The intent is to provide a better understanding
of the underlying economic, organizational, and behavioral dimensions that allowed perpetration
of cryptocurrency law violations.

Method
The WESTLAW computerized database contains electronic copies of published and
unpublished court decisions. A keyword search was used to gather cases on bitcoin and
cryptocurrency offenses decided by all U.S. federal courts until 20 February 2019. The advanced
search parameters required that the term “bitcoin” appeared in the “main body” of the case
(N=62). The authors then read each case individually and determined that not all cases were
relevant to the article’s focus, either because the case did not involve bitcoin or virtual currency,
did not contain sufficient facts to enable full analysis, or contained a decision that either affirmed
or repealed a lower court’s decision, without discussing the facts. Also, some of the cases were
repeated because of the appeal process through the federal courts. The deletion process yielded a
total of 31 federal court cases. The authors conducted an inductive doctrinal analysis (Nolasco,
Vaughn, and del Carmen 2010) to synthesize federal court decisions on bitcoin and virtual
currency, creating a framework from which to organize the analysis (Nolasco and Vaughn 2010;
Nolasco et al. 2015).
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Content Analysis of Federal Court Cases

Mechanisms for perpetrating cryptocurrency crimes
Analysis of federal court cases indicate that offenders in cryptocurrency litigation
perpetrated the following cryptocurrency schemes: (1) operating unlicensed money transmitting
business and/or money laundering; (2) engaging in commodities fraud; (3) orchestrating
securities fraud; (4) creating bitcoin scams, bitcoin exchange fraud, and other criminal activities
related to bitcoin; and (5) owning, administering, or selling on the dark web.

Unlicensed money transmitting businesses
Table 2 summarizes the dimensions of convenience theory within federal court cases
involving unlicensed money transmitting business dealing in cryptocurrency. In several cases,
defendants operated an unlicensed money transmitting business dealing in the virtual currency
bitcoin in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (U.S. v. Faiella 2014; U.S v. Mansy 2017; U.S v. Petix
2016; U.S v. Stetkiw 2019). Defendants involved in unlicensed money transmitting businesses
were motivated by personal or corporate gains (economic dimension). Their positions in the
organization provided them opportunities to perpetrate their unlicensed money transmitting
scheme through: (1) creating front companies to conceal the true nature of their unlicensed
money transmitting business (U.S v. Murgio 2016); (2) accessing resources that enabled them to
defraud investors and government regulators, including company emails, accounts, websites, and
other information technology infrastructure; and (3) implementing procedures in online digital
currency exchanges that guaranteed anonymity among users (U.S. v. Budovsky 2015)
(organizational dimension). Defendants justified or explained their behavior through various
neutralization techniques: (1) alleging legality of action, arguing that state laws did not require
virtual currency exchangers to obtain money service business licenses (U.S v. Lord 2019); and
14

(2) claiming no injury because he or she exchanged cash received from customers for the
equivalent value in bitcoin (U.S. v. Faiella 2014) (behavioral dimension).
_____________________________
Insert Table 2 here
_____________________________

Opportunities: operation of front companies and anonymity among users
Several cases involved defendants who created front companies to conceal the illegal
nature of their businesses. In U.S. v. Murgio (2016), defendant Murgio operated Coin.mx as an
illegal bitcoin exchange and the Collectables Club as a sham front company to help its members
sell and trade valuable memorabilia on the internet. At that time, conventional banks refused to
process bitcoin transactions and closed defendants’ bank accounts upon discovering that they
transacted in bitcoin (U.S. v. Gross 2017:*5). Defendants thus misled banks by making it appear
that the transactions were for the Collectables Club (and other, non-bitcoin businesses),
instructing customers to lie to the banks. Similarly, in U.S. v. Budovsky, 2015, after the Costa
Rican government regulator refused to grant a license to Liberty Reserve, it continued to operate
in Costa Rica through Budovsky’s shell company, transferring funds into more than two dozen
shell-company accounts around the world to evade government seizures.
One case illustrates how anonymity in an online digital currency exchange facilitated its
widespread use among criminal offenders. In 2006, defendants Budovsky and Kats incorporated
Liberty Reserve in Costa Rica to provide online access to the virtual currency LR, “[an] instant,
real-time currency for international commerce” (U.S. v. Budovsky 2015:*1). From 2006 to 2013,
Liberty Reserve processed an estimated 55 million financial transactions and laundered more
than $6 billion in criminal proceeds. Liberty Reserve was not registered with the United States
15

Treasury Department as a money transmitting business. It ensured anonymity by not requiring
users to validate their identity, allowing them to hide their account numbers when transferring
funds to make them untraceable and requiring them to use LR for all transactions. Criminal users
of Liberty Reserve operated from countries worldwide, including China, Nigeria, and the United
States and consisted of computer hackers for hire, drug-dealing websites, and traffickers of
stolen credit card and personal identity information.
In 2009, a Costa Rican government regulatory agency refused to grant a money
transmitting business license to Liberty Reserve because it did not have basic anti-money
laundering controls. Budovsky and his co-defendants then created a computer portal that allowed
Costa Rican regulators to access and monitor fabricated information for suspicious activities. On
November 18, 2011, FinCEN notified financial institutions about the risks associated with
transacting with Liberty Reserve. Liberty Reserve then falsely informed Costa Rican officials
that it sold its business and was no longer operating in Costa Rica, although it continued to
operate through a shell company controlled by Budovsky. Shortly thereafter, the Costa Rican
government seized—pursuant to a request by U.S. law enforcement—approximately $19.5
million in Costa Rican bank accounts held by Liberty Reserve. After this seizure, defendants
moved Liberty Reserve funds into more than two dozen shell-company accounts around the
world to evade further seizures. Budovsky and his co-defendants were charged with: (1)
conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1956(h); (2) conspiracy to
operate an unlicensed money transmission business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (3)
operation of an unlicensed money transmission business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. On
June 23, 2015, Budovsky moved to dismiss the charges. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied the motions.
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Commodities fraud
Table 3 summarizes the dimensions of convenience theory within federal court cases
involving cryptocurrencies considered as commodities fraud. Defendants in commodities fraud
frequently solicit investors to purchase contracts of services involving cryptocurrency, which are
considered commodities by the CFTC. These defendants are generally motivated by greed and
profits derived from illegal operations (economic dimension); their positions within these
companies provide them access to resources needed to defraud investors (organizational
dimension); and they employ various neutralization techniques, including denial of responsibility
and arguing their actions are legal (behavioral dimension). One case illustrates how defendants
neutralize blame by shifting liability to others. In CTFC v. McDonnell (2018b:684), the
defendant created multiple personas when dealing with clients to create the appearance that his
company, CabbageTech, was operated by a specialized teams of experts. In reality, he assumed
multiple employee personas when dealing with customers, including the fake identities of Jason
Flack, Michelle Robertson, and Michelle Robinson.
The defendant’s persona “Jason Flack” ignored client requests to withdraw their
investments by neutralizing blame and shifting liability to his alter-ego Pat, explaining that: (1)
Pat was “100%” the cause of the issues and not the company which “is really good;” (2) the
company is “a legitimate outfit” and is “honestly doing everything possible to rectify the whole
ordeal “in a pretty reasonable time frame with all that needed fixing;” (3) “I’m on your case and
on your side;” and (4) “Pat did not reveal he was hacked [but] paid the ransom quietly behind my
ex-Bosses back” (CTFC v. McDonnell 2018b:684). Defendant further neutralized blame by
pointing out that,
“[t]here is a wave of ransomware attacks globally if you google and [Pat’s] lack of knowledge got
[the company] site caught up in that web. Everyone from Major Corps. to Police Dept’s. have
17

been infected with this malware [sic] top U.S. Gov’t. agencies advise paying the ransom fee
because it’s anonymous encryption that cannot be reversed.” (CTFC v. McDonnell 2018b:685)

_____________________________
Insert Table 3 here
_____________________________
Opportunities: fraudulent promises of exorbitant gains and creation of trust relationships with
clients
Defendants in commodities fraud cases used their positions to falsely promise exorbitant
gains to investors. Defendants in CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. (2018:494) sold more than $6
million worth of cryptocurrency called My Big Coin (“MBC”) by claiming that it was “backed
by gold,” could be used “anywhere MasterCard was accepted,” and was “actively traded on
several currency exchanges.” The CFTC filed suit against defendants, alleging fraud in the sale
of a commodity in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) (7 U.S.C. § 9[1]) and
CFTC regulations (17 C.F.R. § 180.1[a]). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Massachusetts denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.
In another case, defendant Patrick McDonnell, owner and operator of CabbageTech Corp,
sold membership services to provide expert cryptocurrency trading advice to 11 clients who
transferred assets valued at $290,429.29 (CTFC v. McDonnell 2018a, 2018b). He falsely claimed
that clients could potentially earn “300% profits on an investment in less than a week” (CFTC v.
McDonnell 2018a:232). After receiving membership payments, McDonnell shut down his
websites three months later without providing any of the promised trading advice, deleted social
media accounts, ceased communicating with customers, and absconded with customers’ funds
(CTFC v. McDonnell 2018a). On January 18, 2018, the CTC brought enforcement action against
defendant Pat McDonnell and CabbageTech, alleging that they operated “a deceptive and
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fraudulent virtual currency scheme” in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)
(CTFC v. McDonnell 2018b:653). McDonnell filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that CFTC
lacked jurisdiction and standing. In denying the motion, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York held that the CFTC has broad anti-fraud authority over fraud related to
virtual currencies transacted in interstate commerce.
In cases of commodity fraud, defendants made fraudulent statements to gain the trust of
customers. In CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. (2018), defendants gained the trust of clients by
falsely assuring them that MBC was backed by gold and had real fluctuating value in an actively
traded market. Similarly, in CTFC v. McDonnell (2018a, 2018b), Pat McDonnell was charming
and personable, building personal relationships with clients to perpetuate fraud. Investors were
misled by McDonnell’s social media and internet presence, which included “misleading
statements and omissions about his credentials,” such as his “track record and prowess” as a
professional Wall Street trader (CTFC v. McDonnell 2018b:661). He skillfully built personal
relationships of trust and rapport with his customers, called them multiple times, and maintained
constant communication through email, social media, and internet-based chats.

Securities fraud
Table 4 summarizes the economic, organizational, and behavior dimension of
convenience theory as applied to cryptocurrency cases involving securities fraud. Defendants
fraudulently sold securities or initial cryptocurrency coin offerings (“ICO”) that were not
registered with the SEC or were not exempt from registration under federal securities laws for
the following reasons: (1) the prospect of significant financial gains pressured or incentivized
defendants to commit fraud; (2) circumstances provided defendants with opportunities to commit
fraud without detection; and (3) defendants justified their fraudulent acts through various
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neutralization techniques.
_____________________________
Insert Table 4 here
_____________________________
Opportunities: false statements regarding nature and quality of virtual currency, expertise, and
ability of promoters
The prospects of financial gain, investor desire to make huge profits, and defendants’
organizational roles allowed defendants to commit fraud through the following strategies:
First, defendants overrepresented the amount of profits that investors would obtain from
their purchase of virtual currencies (Hodges v. Harrison 2019). They falsely claimed that their
digital tokens would outperform the market. In two related cases, Canadian based-defendants
PlexCorps, Lacroix, and Paradis-Royer organized an ICO for an alleged 1 billion tokens of
PlexCoin (SEC v. PlexCorps 2018a, 2018b). They fraudulently misrepresented that investors
would earn 1,354% profit within 29 days. Defendants proceeded with the ICO even though the
Quebec Financial Administrative Tribunal issued an ex parte order enjoining them from
conducting the ICO. On December 1, 2017, SEC filed an action against defendants for securities
fraud, claiming that they “unlawfully participated in a fraudulent fundraising scheme to obtain
more than $15 million from tens of thousands of investors who purchased PlexCoins” (SEC v.
PlexCorps 2018b:*1). Similarly, defendants in Audet v. Fraser (2017:*3) fraudulently
represented that Paycoin had an estimated value of $80-$100 per coin with a price guarantee that
it “would not fall below a $20 price floor.”
Second, defendants represented that their cryptocurrencies were safe and reliable
investments. Defendant Blockvest, for example, offered the digital coin BLV in exchange for
other virtual currency such as bitcoin and Ether or fiat currency (SEC v. Blockvest, LLC 2018).
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Blockvest falsely claimed that: (1) it was the “First Licensed and Regulated Tokenized Crypto
Currency Exchange & Index Fund based in the US;” (2) the ICO was registered and approved by
the SEC, the CFTC, and the National Futures Association; and (3) the Blockchain Exchange
Commission (“BEC”)—a fictitious regulatory agency with a fake government seal, logo, and
mission statement—regulated their offering (SEC v. Blockvest, LLC 2018:*2). In another case,
defendants in In re Tezos Securities Litigation (2018) also represented that the cryptocurrency
Tezos was “a solution to the shortcomings of predominant digital currencies such as bitcoin and
Ethereum.”
In yet another case, Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC (2019), defendants organized an ICO by
offering their virtual currency ATB Coins (“ATB ICO”). According to defendants, the ATB
Blockchain would be “the fastest blockchain-based cryptographic network in the Milky Way
galaxy,” capable of delivering “blazing fast, secure, and near-zero cost payments to anyone in
the world” (Balestra v. ATBCOIN LLC 2019:*2). Over a three month period, the ICO raised over
$20 million from thousands of investors. The ATB Blockchain did not have the technological
feats that defendants advertised and the value of ATB Coins plummeted. Six months after the
ICO, the value of ATB Coins decreased by more than 85% from its purchase price. Finally, in
Audet v. Fraser (2017), defendants sold physical virtual currency mining equipments, hardwarehosted mining, cloud-hosted mining, investment contracts called Hashlets that “paid returns” on
“virtual currency mining,” their own virtual currency, Paycoin, and “investment contracts called
HashStakers that held Paycoins and paid holders a fixed return” (Audet v. Fraser 2017:*2).
These services were fraudulent because defendants did not own the computer hardware and
computing power it marketed to its customers. They also falsely claimed that banks, investment
firms, and merchants were “financially backing” and “widely adopting it” (Audet v. Fraser 2017:
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*3).
Third, defendants overestimated their abilities and capacities to provide services
promised to investors. In Audet v. Fraser (2017), for instance, defendants oversold their
computing power by triple and quadruple amounts the number of digital products for which they
had the actual ability to support. The sales also occurred before defendants finished setting up the
datacenter where support services and infrastructure would be purportedly stored.

Bitcoin scams, bitcoin exchange fraud, and other criminal activities related to bitcoin
Table 5 summarizes the economic, organizational, and behavior dimension of
convenience theory as applied to bitcoin scams, bitcoin exchange fraud, and other illegal
activities related to the use of bitcoins (U.S. v. Brown 2017; U.S. v. Gross 2017). The economic
motivation for defendant Shrem in Winklevoss Capital Fund, LLC v. Shrem (2019) was his desire
for the Winklevaus brothers to invest in his company BitInstant to raise the public profile of
bitcoin. Shrem offered to purchase bitcoin “at the best price” for the Winklevaus brothers’
Winklevaus Capital Fund, LLC (“WCF”). Shrem, however, misappropriated 5,000 bitcoin worth
$61,000 from the $750,000 investment of WCF.
_____________________________
Insert Table 5 here
_____________________________

In Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd. (2016), defendant Mizuho, a Tokyo-based bank, was
motivated by the desire to continue earning service fees from processing incoming Mt. Gox wire
deposits. Mt. Gox, a bitcoin exchange based in Tokyo, Japan started experiencing internal
problems because: (1) defendant Karpeles (President, CEO, and majority shareholder) was
stealing bitcoins belonging to Mt. Gox users and (2) Mizuho was pressuring Karpeles to close
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the Mt. Gox bank account at Mizuho due to concerns about a U.S. investigation into money
laundering on the Mt. Gox account and potential legal liability or reputational harm to Mizuho.
When Karpeles refused to close the account, Mizuho stopped processing international wire
withdrawals for Mt. Gox, meaning that Mt. Gox users who wired fiat currency to Mizuho could
not withdraw their money. Mizuho, however, did not publicly disclose that it had stopped all
international wire transfers out of the Mt. Gox account; instead, defendants continued to accept
deposits, which earned revenue from service fees. The plaintiffs were U.S. residents who had
wired fiat money to Mizuho for trading in Mt. Gox. After Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy in Japan
on February 28, 2014, plaintiffs could not withdraw the U.S. currency that they wired to Mizuho.
Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Mizuho Bank and Karpeles, asserting claims for
tortious interference with contract, unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, and accounting.
Plaintiffs sought to recover financial losses arising from collapse and bankruptcy of the
exchange.

Opportunity: corporate roles allowing breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation
In the above cases, defendants abused their corporate roles by breaching their fiduciary
duty to their clients and corporate stockholders. Defendant Shrem breached his duty of loyalty to
WCF by pocketing 5,000 bitcoins instead of turning the same over to his principal client
(Winklevoss Capital Fund, LLC v. Shrem 2019). Mizuho Bank did not publicly disclose that it
had stopped all international wire transfers out of the Mt. Gox account but continued accepting
deposits and earning revenues; as a result, investors who continued to deposit money into
Mizuho could not withdraw their funds (Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd. 2016). Defendants in Shin
v. Time Squared Global, LLC (2016) also deceived investors through a bitcoin mining scheme
where they offered: (1) the opportunity to lease ASIC chips that allegedly would mine bitcoins
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and give investors daily revenues from mining and (2) commissions for bringing other investors
into the scheme. The scheme was fraudulent because the ASIC chips did not exist and investors
who brought in other investors did not receive the promised commissions.
The case of U.S. v. Gross (2017) illustrates how defendants Murgio, Lebedev, and Gross
abused their corporate positions to defraud corporate stockholders. Murgio and Lebedev operated
Coin.mx as an illegal bitcoin exchange. They decided to take full control of a federal credit union
to facilitate their bitcoin transactions. They paid $206,000 in bribes to Gross, Chairman of the
Board of Directors (“Board”) of Helping Other People Excel Federal Credit Union (“HOPE”) to
enable them to take over the Board of HOPE and to “evade potential scrutiny” from other
financial institutions about the nature of their bitcoin business (U.S. v. Gross 2017:*1). After
taking control of HOPE, defendants allowed KapCharge, a Canadian payment processing
company, to process Coin.mx’s automated clearing house (“ACH”) transactions at HOPE
(including its bitcoin transactions). Defendants allowed the processing of ACH transactions that
were “unsafe” for the credit union because of lack of efforts to comply with various financial
regulations (e.g., the Bank Secrecy Act and the Office of Foreign Asset Control) and the
magnitude of these ACH transactions given the level of HOPE’s capitalization, which was
inconsistent with existing federal regulations (U.S. v. Gross 2017:*10). On March 17, 2017,
defendant Gross was convicted of two counts: (1) participating in a conspiracy to bribe the
Chairman of a federal credit union, obstructing an examination of the National Credit Union
Administration (“NCUA”), and making false statements to the NCUA; and, (2) accepting bribes.

The dark web
In several cases, defendants used bitcoin to participate in the dark web or to facilitate
their illegal activities, such as drug trafficking and the purchase and sale of illegal drugs. A
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category of virtual currency litigation on the dark web involved vendors (U.S v. Colldock 2017;
U.S v. Donagal 2014) or purchasers (U.S. v. Michell 2018; U.S. v. Reuer 2019) of illegal
substances, such as Xanax powder, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and heroin. In these cases,
defendants in cryptocurrency litigation involving the dark web were motivated by personal
and/or corporate gains. Thousands of vendors, for example, used the dark web Silk Road to sell
$183 million worth of illegal drugs, goods, and services. Ulbricht, the owner and operator of Silk
Road who operated under the username Dread Pirate Roberts (“DPR”), earned millions of dollars
in commissions profits (based on a portion of sellers’ revenues) from transactions conducted on
Silk Road (U.S. v. Ulbricht 2014, 2017). Vallerius, a Paris-based defendant, also acted as
operator, administrator, moderator, and vendor of the dark web Dream Market under the
username “OxyMonster” (U.S v. Vallerius 2018:*1). He received millions of dollars through the
use of a bitcoin tip jar or electronic depository. Table 6 summarizes the economic,
organizational, and behavior dimension of convenience theory as applied to cryptocurrency
litigation involving the dark web.
_____________________________
Insert Table 6 here
_____________________________
Opportunities: anonymity of transactions and layers of security in the dark web
Defendants in cryptocurrency litigation availed themselves of characteristics of the dark
web and exploited situational opportunities that allowed them to commit financial crime. The
anonymity of transactions on the dark web gave defendants a sense of security that transactions
would not be traceable to them by law enforcement authorities. The dark web’s guaranty of
anonymity is facilitated by: (1) the use of the Tor network that anonymizes internet traffic and
makes it difficult to trace; (2) the use of virtual currencies, including bitcoin that enable
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anonymous transactions not traceable to specific accounts and users; and (3) the ability to create
multiple false accounts without means of identification.
Two related cases illustrate how the intrinsic nature of the dark web facilitates the
perpetration of financial crime. Ulbricht, owner and operator of Silk Road under the alias of
Dread Pirate Roberts (“DPR”), designed Silk Road as an online criminal marketplace (U.S. v.
Ulbricht 2014, 2017). The Tor software of Silk Road enabled users to access the Internet
anonymously by obscuring users’ unique identifying Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses, which
prevented surveillance or tracking by law enforcement authorities. All purchases conducted on
Silk Road used bitcoins, an anonymous online currency (U.S. v. Ulbricht 2017). Between 2011
to 2013, Ulbricht through Silk Road enabled users located “anywhere in the world with an
internet connection” to anonymously buy and sell illegal drugs and other illicit goods and
services, including: (1) “heroin, cocaine, and lysergic acid diethylamide”; (2) malicious software
designed for computer hacking, such as “password stealers, keyloggers, and remote access
tools”; and (3) “murder-for-hire” schemes (U.S. v. Ulbricht 2014:549-550). In September 2013,
after Ulbricht became a primary suspect in the DPR investigation, the government obtained five
pen/trap orders under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (the “Pen/Trap Act”). The pen/trap orders did not
permit access to the content of Ulbricht’s communications. Instead, the orders authorized law
enforcement agents to “collect IP address data for Internet traffic to and from Ulbricht’s home
wireless router and other devices that regularly connected to Ulbricht’s home router” (U.S. v.
Ulbricht 2017:83). Ulbricht was arrested in a San Francisco public library on October 1, 2013.
On the day of Ulbricht’s arrest, the government obtained a warrant to seize Ulbricht’s laptop and
search it for information related to Silk Road and information that would identify Ulbricht as
DPR.
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Another characteristic of dark web operations is the ability to reach global markets at a
rapid pace (Holt, Burruss, and Bossler 2018). Since the dark web is accessible online by anyone
with a reliable computer and an internet connection, its potential reach is only limited by the
confines of the internet. The dark web is also capable of operating initially without detection by
law enforcement authorities or government regulators. This lack of regulation and visibility at
the outset enables it to operate under the radar of government authorities—at least until it reaches
a critical mass in terms of transactions and currency before government regulators become aware
of its operations.

Conclusion
Analysis of federal case law reveal patterns and methods of perpetrating illegal
cryptocurrency activities, including operating unlicensed money transmitting and money service
businesses, commodity fraud, securities fraud, bitcoin scams, including bitcoin exchange fraud
and corporate takeover of a credit union to perpetuate illegal bitcoin transactions. Other
cryptocurrency crime was administered on the dark web, which involved selling and purchasing
illegal goods and services. Analysis of U.S. federal district and circuit court case law involving
cryptocurrency crimes and fraud indicate support for the convenience theory of white-collar
crime. Defendants in various schemes were motivated by financial gain, either for the company
or for personal use. Their roles and positions in the businesses allowed them access to resources
that helped them perpetrate fraud against clients, investors, and stockholders, including availing
of the following opportunities and favorable circumstances: (1) operation of front companies in
cases involving unlicensed money transmitting and money service businesses dealing with
bitcoins and other virtual currencies; (2) relationship building by defendants and neutralization of
blame in cases of commodity fraud; (3) over representing profits that investors would obtain
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from purchases of virtual currencies, representing that tokens were safe and reliable investments
when they were risky, and overestimating abilities and capacities to provide services promised to
investors in securities fraud; (4) breaching fiduciary duties to their clients and corporate
stockholders in bitcoin scams by misappropriating profits and service fees to which they were
not entitled or using the company for their own personal profits instead of for the stockholders’
and investors’ benefits; and (5) engaging in dark web transactions by administrators, vendors,
and purchasers that were guaranteed anonymity and through an online venue that had far
reaching and rapid global access and was not actively regulated by law enforcement or
government authorities. Defendants employed various neutralization techniques to justify their
crimes, which included allegations of legal mistake and the legality of their actions. Defendants
also denied injury or harm, denied responsibility, condemned the condemners, appealed to higher
loyalties, and presented dilemma trade-offs by weighing various concerns that resulted in the
illegal act, including normality of action.
This article contributes to existing literature in the nascent field of cryptocurrency crime
by providing a comprehensive analysis based on federal case law of how various types of
cryptocurrency crimes are perpetrated. The article also develops common themes underlying
each type of cryptocurrency crime activities, and the reasoning and modus operandi of federal
court defendants. The article also uses convenience theory to more fully understand
cryptocurrency crimes and fraudulent schemes. Reliance on case law serves as a proxy for
interviewing persons involved in cryptocurrency crimes. Future research should empirically
examine cryptocurrency crimes to determine the factors that predict either engaging in
cryptocurrency crime or victimization in cryptocurrency crime.
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